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TO IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY, LET’S USE
FEES TO WEED OUT WEAK PATENTS
Brian J. Love1
Berkeley Technology Law Journal Commentaries (March 12, 2016),
http://btlj.org/2016/03/to-improve-patent-quality-lets-use-fees-to-weed-out-weak-patents/
Too often, proposals for improving patent quality zero in on modifications to narrow aspects of
patent examination—tweaks that, at best, will only improve future applications—without considering
broader reforms that can improve all patents, including those currently in force. The PTO’s current
batch of “New Quality Proposals,” unfortunately, suffers from this same shortsightedness.2 Not a
single proposal aims to enhance the quality of issued patents. Nor do any take advantage of what is
perhaps the most straightforward policy lever at the agency’s disposal: the ability to set fees. In my
view, the PTO’s failure to take a sufficiently expansive view of “patent quality,” and of the tools
available to enhance it, ensures that its efforts will fall far short of their potential.
Examination Tweaks Aren’t Enough
This is true, first, because proposals applying exclusively to examination offer at best an incomplete
solution. As a practical matter, invalid patents will continue to issue despite the PTO’s best efforts to
improve examination. For example, current claim construction rules allow the meaning of claim
language to expand over time to cover after-arising technology that was unforeseeable at the time of
examination.3 Also, it is nigh impossible for examiners to locate prior art in nascent, rapidly-evolving
fields that lack a comprehensively indexed technical literature.4 As a result, thorough examination
can only go so far in improving the quality of new patents. Moreover, reforms that focus exclusively
on examination ignore the roughly two million patents already in force, 5 the vast majority of which
issued during previous eras when examination and patentability standards were far more lax.6 In
short, efforts to improve patent quality must not end with a notice of allowance, but rather should
extend throughout the term of patent protection.
Second, proposals that merely tweak examination fail to take advantage of the PTO’s newly-granted
authority to set fees.7 Because a patent’s value depends in large measure on its quality, owners and
seekers of low-quality patents are the most sensitive to fluctuations in patent office fees and, thus,
also the most likely to allow their existing patents to expire and reduce their future filings in response
to an increase in fees. Fee reductions can help, too. Patentees that assert low-quality patents in bad

faith are most likely to direct their abuse at parties for whom the costs of defense are particularly
onerous and, thus, who are also most likely to defend themselves by petitioning for administrative
review of asserted patents—rather than settling for nuisance value—in response to a reduction in
required fees. In both situations, fee changes improve overall patent quality directly by reducing the
quantity of questionable patents and applications, as well as indirectly by freeing up PTO resources
to examine with greater care the smaller number of applications that are filed as a result of these
changes.
Accordingly, the PTO should consider at least two reforms that leverage fees to enhance the quality
of all patents, current and future.
Let’s Increase Maintenance Fees
First, the PTO should increase maintenance fees to hasten the expiration of low-quality patents.
Weak patents impose costs on society principally when asserted in nuisance suits, and older patents
are among those most often enforced in an abusive manner. In a recent empirical study of the ages of
asserted patents, I found significant disparity between the relative ages of patents asserted by
product-producing tech companies and those asserted by non-practicing entities (NPEs),8 the subset
of patentees most able to leverage the high cost of patent litigation to induce nuisance-value
settlements.9 Notably, I found that companies that acquired patents purely for enforcement purposes
were responsible for more than two-thirds of patent suits, naming more than four-fifths of all
individual defendants, filed in the last five years of the asserted patent’s term.10 The variance in
litigation timing in my sample was so dramatic that all suits asserting the average product-company
patent were resolved before the average NPE patent was asserted for the first time.11 In short, old
patents are among those that are least likely to be used by tech companies to protect new products
from their competitors—the sine qua non of the patent system—and, instead, among the most likely
to wind up in the hands of companies that specialize in filing abusive lawsuits en masse against
established technologies.
Unfortunately, the PTO’s present maintenance fee structure is ill-equipped to hasten the expiration of
low-quality patents before (or while) they are misused. For one, there are too few payments required
and payments obligations end too early in the patent term. Under current rules, the final of three
maintenance fee payments is due 11.5 years after issuance,12 many years before the term of
protection ends for most patents and often before abused patents wind up in the hands of those who
misuse them.13 As a result, the cost of renewal overwhelmingly falls on legitimate innovators using
the patent system as intended, rather than on unscrupulous entities that acquire vague patents late in

the term for the purpose of exploiting weaknesses in the litigation system. Annual renewal fees that
phase in during the latter half of the patent term would more efficiently accelerate the expiration of
patents as soon as the inventions they were originally filed to protect become obsolete. 14
In addition, maintenance fees are currently too low. Ideally, fees should be set at levels that require
patent owners to internalize the full social costs of their patent rights, much like “Pigovian” taxes on
gasoline or aluminum cans ensure that consumers internalize the negative externalities created by
their purchases.15 Though estimates of the deadweight loss of the patent system vary, even a
conservative estimate would safely place the total in the billions of dollars, if not the tens of billions,
per year.16 As a result, the average annual cost of maintaining one of the roughly two million patents
presently in force should at a minimum exceed $1,000 per year,17 and perhaps should reach $10,000
per year or more.18 Today, even large entities are charged fees that average less than $750 per year. 19
In addition to better aligning patentees’ incentives to obtain patents with the social costs of those
rights, increased fees would also help align U.S. patent fees more closely with those required in the
past, as well as with those required today in other parts of the world. Today’s patent fees are
relatively low, both internationally and historically.20 Many countries, including the United
Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Canada, already charge annual maintenance fees after the first few
years of patent protection.21 Perhaps not coincidentally, these jurisdictions also experience a much
lower incidence of abusive patent enforcement.22 Also, relative to GDP per capita, U.S. patent fees
are near historical all-time lows.23 Measured this way, fees today are about one-tenth as expensive as
they were in 1800.24
Reduce Fees for Administrative Challenges
Second, the PTO should reduce filing fees for post-grant administrative challenges to make it
possible for more accused infringers, especially small and medium-sized businesses operating
outside the tech industry, to take advantage of those procedures in defense against low-quality
patents asserted in court. Like maintenance fees, post-issue administrative challenges also help weed
out low-quality patents issued in the past. In the last two years alone, thousands of invalid claims in
hundreds of issued patents have been eliminated in inter partes review (IPR) and other forms of postgrant challenges.25 Many of these patents earned millions of dollars in unwarranted settlements
before being eliminated.26
While, on the whole, post-grant challenges have proven to be very beneficial to those accused of
infringing low-quality patents, companies that are most susceptible to abusive litigation—small
businesses and downstream purchasers of the accused technology27—have been reluctant to pursue

them to date. In a recent empirical study, I found that technology purchasers and small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) are both underrepresented among IPR petitioners relative to the share of
patent suits filed against them.28 Though over a third of patent suits in recent years accused
technology purchasers of infringement, purchasers represent less than 7% of IPR
petitioners.29 Similarly, while SMEs were targeted in about 30% of patent suits during the same
period, just 21% of IPRs are initiated by SMEs.30
A likely explanation for this underrepresentation is the relatively steep cost of IPR. Though certainly
cheaper than full blown litigation, IPR still generally costs in excess of $250,000, an amount that
leaves ample room for patentees to leverage low-quality patents into nuisance value settlements.
There may not be much the PTO can do to reduce cost of legal fees for IPR, but the PTO can lower
the fees required to file a petition. Currently, petition and institution fees total at least $23,000, with
no discount for small or micro entities.31 For cost-conscious petitioners, these fees represent close to
ten percent of the entire cost of pursuing an IPR petition to a final decision. By contrast, the filing fee
for a civil suit in federal court is a mere $350.32
***
In short, efforts to enhance patent quality should additionally include efforts to improve the overall
quality of the pool of issued patents, and moreover, should draw upon all of the PTO’s powers,
including the power to set fees, to meet its quality-enhancing goals. By increasing the frequency and
size of maintenance fee payments, the PTO can significantly mitigate the social costs that low-quality
patents impose by decreasing the supply of low-quality patents available for use in abusive suits, as
well as increasing the costs borne by those entities likely to abuse them. In addition, reducing the
filing and institution fees for those bringing post-issue challenges—or, at a minimum, creating a fee
discount for small and micro entities—will make those procedures more affordable to the parties that
would benefit from them the most. If these steps are taken, fewer low-quality patents will issue in the
future and existing patents of low-quality will expire or be challenged with greater frequency. With
fees set at the right levels, today’s patent quality problems might just become a thing of the past.
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